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| Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas. |
| In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: CEO; Pay–Performance Sensitivity; Stock; Options; Financial Economics; G34; J33; M52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92834 |
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| Johnston, James. |
| One aspect of the study of executive remuneration that has received comparatively little attention is its ability to shed light on the governance of the corporation. The level of a Chief Executive Officer’s remuneration will embody information on both the market within which a business operates and the effectiveness of its independent directors as instruments of corporate governance. Differences in the salaries of top directors that cannot be accounted for by differences in business performance may provide useful evidence on the health of a company’s governance mechanisms. This paper contains the results of an empirical investigation into the role of external competition and internal controls in generating the executive salaries that we observe in the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: CEO remuneration; Independent directors; Corporate governance reform; Financial Economics; J30; M52. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50160 |
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